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In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) 
auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q 
and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the 
auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We 
characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting where bidders are ex ante 
symmetric and have independent private values. We show that, if the number of 
bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price 
auction. 
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Informaation hankinta hollantilaisen huutokaupan 
aikana 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 7/2010 
Paavo Miettinen 




Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitetään tasapainokäyttäytymistä ns. hollantilaisessa eli 
laskevan hinnan huutokaupassa. Tarjoajat, jotka eivät tiedä huutokaupattavaan 
hyödykkeeseen kohdistuvaa arvostustaan todennäköisyydellä 1-q, voivat hankkia 
informaatiota tavaran arvosta huutokaupan aikana. Informaatio hankitaan muiden 
tarjoajien näkemättä. Näin ollen tarjoajat eivät tiedä, kuinka moni muista tarjoajis-
ta tietää oman arvostuksensa. Tutkimuksessa luonnehditaan tasapainokäyttäyty-
mistä, kun tarjoajat ovat ex-ante-symmetrisiä ja tarjoajien arvostukset ovat 
jakautuneet riippumattomasti toisistaan. Tarjoajan arvostus objektia kohtaan ei 
riipu muiden tarjoajien arvostuksista. Päätulos on, että kun tarjoajien määrä on 
riittävän suuri, hollantilainen huutokauppa tuottaa myyjälle enemmän tuloja kuin 
ensimmäisen hinnan huutokauppa. 
 
Avainsanat: huutokaupat, informaation hankinta 
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The theory of auctions usually assumes that the bidders know their valuations
for the object to be auctioned. However, there are many instances where this
may not be the case: When a venture capitalist is trying to sell a business
that it owns it is not immediately clear how much is the company worth for
a potential buyer. In addition, if the venture capitalist is unable to sell the
company to some set of ﬁrms with a given price, he is pushed to lower the
p r i c et h a th ea s k s( o rr e f r a i nf r o ms e l l i n g ) . Al o w e rp r i c em a ya t t r a c tt h e
interest of some additional ﬁrms. Firms that were not initially interested in
the company may want to asses how much the company is worth for them as
the price is lowered. Similarly a company that contemplates entering into a
takeover battle for one of its rivals must ﬁr s te v a l u a t eh o wm u c ht h er i v a lﬁrm
is worth.
Levin and Smith (1994) take up the question of endogenous entry in
auctions. In their model the bidders have to incur a positive cost in order
to participate into the auction. By paying the participation cost the bidders
also learn their valuations for the object. After the bidders have decided
about participation the number of participants in made common knowledge.
The object is then auctioned to the participating bidders. In a symmetric
equilibrium the bidders mix with respect to their decision to participate into
the auction. Once the number of participants is clear bidding follows the
regular equilibrium behavior in the corresponding auction.
When a static auction is in question this approach is ﬁne, as there is only
‘one round of bidding’. In a dynamic auction, such as a Dutch or an English
auction, the ‘decision to participate’ can also be made during the auction.
That is, if the bidders are allowed to participate into the auction after it has
started. The example involving a venture capitalist above ﬁts into this kind
of a situation. Another example, that shares the descending nature of prices,
is the After-Christmas sales. The sales typically start with a speciﬁc discount
percentage. The discount percentage is then increased as the sales proceeds.1
These examples suggest that participation decisions during the auction deserve
attention for reasons that are not purely theoretical.
In this paper we study the bidding and information acquisition behavior in
the following setting: There are  bidders that can be active in the auction.
Each bidder knows his valuation with probability . Each initially uninformed
bidder may become informed by incurring a cost of 0. We assume that
every bidder, informed or not, is allowed to participate into the auction. That
is, a bidder may bid for the object even if he is not informed.2 We study
1This year the sales after Christmas in some of F i n l a n d ’ sd e p a r t m e n ts t o r e ss t a r t e dw i t h
40 per cent discount. The discount increased up to 70 per cent towards the end of January.
The sales for clothing for example, typically involves many items and is not an exact match
to the model presented here unless only one item remains in store. However, two features
are in common: 1.) the price for the goods in the sale descends 2.) the buyers must incur
the cost of inspecting if their size is left in the store.
2The analysis remains the same when  is interpreted as the cost of participating and
becoming informed if it is assumed that the seller does not disclose any information about
the number of participants. This is because there is no uninformed bidding takes place in
the equilibrium that we consider.
7the Dutch auction where we assume that each uninformed bidder can decide
t h ep r i c ea tw h i c hh ea c q u i r e si n f o r m a t i o n .I ft h eo b j e c ti sn o ts o l db e f o r et h e
‘information acquisition price’ the bidder becomes informed about his valuation
and incurs the cost . The bidder may then end the auction immediately, or
wait for the price to descend further. We also study the ﬁrst price sealed bid
auction in this setting. In the ﬁrst price auction the information acquisition
decisions precede bidding.
We assume that the bidders’ decision to acquire information is covert.
Hence each bidder only knows the number of potential competitors. At
any given time a bidder does not now how many other bidders have already
acquired information or how many other bidders were initially informed.
We consider the case where the bidders have independent private values.
We solve for the symmetric equilibrium in the Dutch and in the ﬁrst price sealed
bid auction. In the Dutch auction the uninformed bidders mix with respect
to the price at which the information is acquired. The bidding is determined
by a pure strategy (conditional on the acquired information). In the ﬁrst
price auction we study the case where the uninformed bidders choose not to
acquire information in equilibrium. In the ﬁrst price auction the information
acquisition is discouraged when the number of bidders becomes large. In this
case the informed bidders use a pure strategy and the uninformed bidders
determine their bids by a mixed strategy. We then compare the revenues that
the ﬁrst price auction and the Dutch auction produce when the number of
bidders grows large. We show that in this case the Dutch auction produces
larger revenue than the ﬁrst price auction.
Related literature
Papers that are most related to the issue of information acquisition during the
auction are by Bergemann and Välimäki (2005), Compte and Jehiel (2006) and
Rezende (2005). Compte and Jehiel (2006) consider information acquisition
during an ascending price auction. They allow for information acquisition
at any point during the auction in a setting where each bidder has a chance
of being informed about his valuation. They show that the ascending price
auction can generate higher revenue than the second price sealed bid auction.
The setup of this paper coincides with the one analyzed by Compte and Jehiel
(2006). Rezende (2005) also studies an ascending price auction, but in his
model the bidders have initial estimates about their valuations and they may
learn their exact valuation during the auction. He assumes that the bidders’
initial estimates provide statistical information about their true valuation.
Additionally, Rezende assumes that the cost of information acquisition is
private information and that other bidders’ drop out points are not observed
before the auction ends, contrary to the paper by Compte and Jehiel. He
characterizes the equilibrium information acquisition strategy and shows, like
Compte and Jehiel, that the ascending auction is revenue superior (in some
cases) to the second price auction.
Bergemann and Välimäki (2005) survey the literature on information and
mechanism design and they emphasize the importance of further work on
sequential information acquisition in dynamic auctions. Other related work
on information acquisition in static auctions and mechanism design are by
8Milgrom (1981), Persico (2000) and Bergemann and Välimäki (2002). Both
Milgrom (1981) and Persico (2000) study a situation where the decision to
acquire information is made before any bidding takes place. Milgrom (1981)
studies the incentives to acquire information in a second price auction while
Persico (2000) studies the incentives that the ﬁrst price and second price
auctions provide for information acquisition. Bergemann and Välimäki (2002)
study a general mechanism design problem and ask when it is the case that
a mechanism provides ex-ante eﬃcient information acquisition incentives and
implements the eﬃcient outcome ex-post.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we ﬁrst introduce the model.
We give the reader some ﬂavor of the equilibrium before delving into the proofs
of the equilibrium strategies. We then derive equilibrium strategies for the
Dutch and the ﬁrst price auctions. Section 3 works out an approximation for
t h er e v e n u e st h a to n eo b t a i n si naD u t c ha u c t i o na n di nt h eﬁrst price sealed
bid auction. We then show that the Dutch auction produces more revenue
than the ﬁrst price auction when  is large. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
There are  ≥ 2 bidders with i.i.d. valuations , generically denoted by .
The valuations are distributed on [0¯ ] according to an absolutely continuous
distribution function (·), with a density (·). Each bidder knows his valuation
with probability 0. Hence the number of informed bidders is binomially
distributed. The bidders who do not know their valuation may acquire
information about their valuation by incurring a cost 0. We assume
that the bidders cannot distinguish between the uninformed and informed
bidders. That is, we assume that the information acquisition is covert. We
analyze both the Dutch and the ﬁrst price sealed bid auction. In a Dutch
auction the auctioneer begins with a high asking price which is lowered until
some participant announces his willingness to buy the object at the current
price. This participant wins the auction and pays the current price. In the
Dutch auction we assume that the uninformed bidders can acquire information
at any price during the auction. In a ﬁrst price auction the auctioneer asks
the bidders to submit sealed bids for the object. The auctioneer collects the
bids and declares the bidder with the highest bid as a winner. The winning
bidder pays his bid. In the ﬁrst price auction the information must be acquired
prior to the bidding stage. That is, the bidders ﬁrst make decisions about the
information acquisition and then submit sealed bids to the auctioneer. To ease
the notation in the paper we denote by ˜ ()=( ()+1− )−1 and by
()=()−1. The corresponding density functions are denoted by ˜ ()
and ().
A sketch of the Dutch auction equilibrium
To get a ﬂavor of the equilibrium it is useful to start by considering the
information acquisition decision. We argue that the information acquisition
must take place over an interval of prices. Consider what happens if the
information acquisition were to take place at a speciﬁc price. If the price
9is ‘low’ the informed bidders have an incentive to bid slightly before the
price, since competition intensiﬁes after the price is reached. If the price is
‘high’, the uninformed bidders have an incentive to wait for others to acquire
information ﬁrst and acquire information if the price descends enough. This
carries the information that the other bidders’ valuations are not high and that
the chances of winning the auction are good. On the other hand if the auction
ends soon after the information acquisition price the bidder who decided to
wait saves the information acquisition cost. Therefore, in equilibrium, the
information acquisition price is decided by mixing over an interval of prices.
Since the information is acquired over an interval, it means that the
problem that the informed agents face changes when the price arrives to
the information acquisition range. This is because the amount of potential
competitors increases. The equilibrium that we derive builds on the existence
of a threshold valuation ∗. The bidder with this valuation is indiﬀerent
between bidding any price over the mixing interval. When the price is in
the mixing interval, a bidder with a valuation higher than ∗ wants to buy
immediately and a bidder with a valuation lower than ∗ wants to wait for
the price to descend. Our assumptions guarantee that all bidders are willing
to acquire information in the auction. Therefore, in equilibrium, it is common
k n o w l e d g et h a ta l lb i d d e r sa r ei n f o r m e do n c et h ep r i c eh a sr e a c h e dt h el o w e r
bound of the mixing interval. With these observations as our guide we now
proceed to the equilibrium bidding strategies.
The Dutch auction equilibrium strategies
We ﬁrst make the following assumptions that concern the size of the
information acquisition cost .




( − ∗)() (2.1)
for some ∗ ∈ [0¯ ].
Assumption 2. The information acquisition cost 0 and the







Assumptions 1 and 2 are needed for the constructed equilibrium to exist.
In practice they imply that the information acquisition cost 0 should not
be too large. One immediate consequence from assumption 2 is that ∗ 
. It can be readily checked that assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed with an
information acquisition cost  =0 01,  =5and when the distribution is
uniform, exponential or beta.3 Naturally the smaller the cost of information
3For example, the exponential distribution with parameters,  =2and 5 works and
respectively the beta distribution with parameters ()=( 1 2) and (21).I t h i n k t h a t
for a small  and large enough  the assumptions 1 and 2 can be satisﬁed also for a normal
distribution. However, there are some problems involved with recovering the critical value
∗.
10acquisition and the larger the amount of bidders the easier it is to fulﬁll the
assumptions. We are now ready for the equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 1. The following strategies constitute a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the Dutch auction.
• The informed bidders choose the amount they bid according to
˜ ()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
R 
0 ˜ () + c
˜ ()





where ˜ ()=( ()+( 1− ))−1, ()=()−1 and
 =
R ∗
0 ˜ () − ().
• The uninformed bidders choose the price  at which they acquire










(1 − )(1 − (∗)
w i t ht h ep r o p e r t yt h a t()=0and (¯ )=1 . After information is
acquired the (un)informed bid according to the informed bidders strategy.
If the information acquisition price  is such that ˜ () ≥  then the
uninformed bidder bids .
We now prove proposition 1 with the following ﬁve lemmata. The lemmas
1 and 2 show that the strategy is optimal for the informed bidders. In lemma
3 we derive the mixing distribution for the uninformed and the end points of
the mixing interval. Finally lemmas 4 and 5 show that there are no proﬁtable
deviations for the uninformed bidders.
Lemma 1. The informed bidders with valuations  ≥ ∗ have no proﬁtable
deviation.
Proof. Consider the informed bidder with type  ≥ ∗. His expected











( − ˜ ())




˜ () + c
(2.3)
The expected payoﬀ while he is bidding as if his type was  is given by
11E(˜ ()) = ˜ ()( − ˜ ())
= ˜ ()( − )+
Z 
0
˜ () + c
(2.4)
Subtracting the equation (2.4) from (2.3) we obtain
E(˜ ()) − E(˜ ()) = ( − ) ˜ () −
Z 

˜ () ≥ 0
where the inequality holds irrespective of  ≷ .
Lemma 2. The informed bidders with valuations  ≤ ∗ have no proﬁtable
deviation.
Proof. Consider the bidding problem for the informed agent, when the


















(∗)+( 1− )((∗)+( 1− (∗))())
´−1
( − )
The probability that the informed bidder wins and gets a payoﬀ of − consists
of the following three events. All informed bidders valuations are below ∗,
which refers to the term (∗). The uninformed bidders have valuations
below ∗, which refers to the term (1 − )(∗). Finally the uninformed
bidders whose valuations are above ∗ have not acquired information prior to
, which refers to the term (1 − )(1 − (∗))(). Substituting for () in
the expected utility we obtain after a bit of algebra that
E(()) = ˜ (∗)
Ã




N o wi ti si m m e d i a t et h a t ,i f = ∗ the expected utility is a constant. In
addition, the expected utility is increasing in  if  ∗ and decreasing in
 if  ∗. The initially uninformed bidders with  ∗ want to bid in
immediately once they obtain information about their valuation, since their
expected utility decreases when the price decreases. Conversely bidders with
av a l u a t i o n ∗ want to wait for the price to descend as their expected
utility increases when the price decreases. It is also clear from this analysis
that the critical type ∗ is unique.4 Finally the optimality of ˜ (·) when 
follows from the strategic equivalence between the ﬁrst price auction and a
Dutch auction where the valuations are distributed on [0 ∗].
Lemma 3. The uninformed bidders’ mixing is determined by (·),t h e
mixing interval is [ ¯ ] and  is deﬁned as in proposition 1.5
4If 
0  ∗ were the critical type, then the expected utility would decrease as the price
increases conversely to the assumption of being a critical type.
5(See omitted proofs at the end for some additional derivations.)
12Proof. We need that the uninformed bidder is indiﬀerent between
acquiring information at any price  on the interval ( ¯ ). The expected utility











(∗ − )(1 − (∗))
´
Since (·) is a distribution function we have that (¯ )=1 . We set  =¯  and




( − ˜ ())()() + ˜ (∗)
³
(∗ − ¯ )(1 − (∗))
´
(2.5)
We substitute  out and solve for () to get
()=
(∗)+( 1− )
(1 − )(1 − (∗))
Ã






(1 − )(1 − (∗)
In equilibrium the (initially) informed bidders never bid when the price is
in the range ( ¯ ). The bidder with the type ∗ is indiﬀerent between bidding
any price in the interval [ ¯ ]. Therefore  = (∗)=
 ∗
0 ()
(∗) and we can
use the fact that ()=0to solve for ¯ . This yields
¯  =




By the indiﬀerence condition for the type ∗ we also need that ˜ (∗)=¯ .




˜ () − ()
Lemma 4. The uninformed bidders do not acquire information prior to ¯ 
or wait beyond .6
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case where an uninformed agent considers









˜ ()( − ˜ ())()







( − )() − 
´







0 ˜ () − c
³Z ¯ 

() −  − (1 − ())
´







−˜ () ≥ 0 and
R ¯ 
 () −  − (1 − ()) is decreasing
in  we have that 




0 () −  − 
0(1 − (
0)) = 0 for 
0 = ∗.
Now consider the case where the uninformed is acquiring information at a






























 ()−−(1−()) is decreasing in  we have that 
 ≥ 0 for
 . This is because ˜ 
−1






0 = ∗ .
Lemma 5. No bidders stay uninformed in equilibrium.
Proof. We need to show that bidding the best response to ˜ () without
acquiring information yields less than bidding according to the equilibrium
strategy. Notice that Assumption 2 implies that  ∗. Therefore, the best
response to ˜ () for a bidder that remains uninformed is the same as the best
response by a bidder whose valuation is exactly . The expected payoﬀ from
bidding ˜ () is given by
³






The expected equilibrium payoﬀ for an uninformed bidder is derived
in equation (2.5). Subtracting equation (2.6) from equation (2.5) and











which is non-negative by our Assumption 2.
The ﬁrst price auction equilibrium strategies
We now derive the equilibrium strategies in the ﬁrst price auction. We focus
o nt h ec a s ew h e r et h en u m b e ro fi n f o r m e db i d d e r si ss ol a r g et h a ti n f o r m a t i o n
acquisition is an undesirable option for the uninformed bidders.7 That is,
the cost of information acquisition is larger than the expected payoﬀ for an
uninformed bidder who knows that there can be up to −1 informed bidders
7We formalize this assumption below.
14in the auction.8 This means that the uninformed bidders choose their bids
t h r o u g ham i x e ds t r a t e g y . 9 Note that the problem for the informed bidders
is similar to what the informed bidders face in the Dutch auction. When the
price is above the upper bound of the mixing interval the informed bidders
solve the ‘same’ problem as in (2.3). The only thing that is diﬀerent is the
way that the constant of integration is determined.
The equilibrium has similar features as the Dutch auction equilibrium. In
the proof below we use lemma 1 to show that the proposed strategy is an
equilibrium for the informed bidders. The diﬀerences concern the uninformed
bidders’ behavior. This is also where the proof focuses on.
Proposition 2. The following strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the ﬁrst price auction, when the information acquisition for




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
R 
0 ˜ () +ˆ c
˜ ()





where ˜ ()=( ()+( 1− ))−1, ()=()−1 and
ˆ  =
R 
0 ˜ () − −1(). The uninformed bidders use a mixed strategy
over the interval [˜  ˆ ],w h e r e˜  = () and ˆ  = ˜ ().T h em i x e ds t r a t e g y
distribution function is
ˆ (·)=








Proof. When the price is above ˆ  the informed bidders solve the problem
in (2.3). Then the diﬀerence between the informed bidders’ bid functions in
the Dutch and in the ﬁrst price auction is between constants  and ˆ . Since the
proof that there are no deviations is identical to the one presented in Lemma
1, we skip it here.
8Suppose that there are gains from information acquisition to the uninformed. Assume
also that the cost of information acquisition does not accommodate all bidders acquiring
information before the auction. Then the uninformed bidders choose whether to acquire
information or stay uninformed by using a mixed strategy. This complicates the revenue
comparison signiﬁcantly and I do not pursue this comparison here.
9Suppose that there is a price  at which all uninformed bidders bid. This price must be
weakly below  to guarantee an expected payoﬀ that is weakly above zero. If  = ,t h e n
in the case that there is only one uninformed bidder, this bidder can proﬁtably deviate to
some 0  .I fthen any uninformed bidder can proﬁtably deviate by bidding some
0 =  +  for an epsilon small enough. This guarantees virtually the same ex-post payoﬀ
as bidding  but with a higher probability, as the bidder avoids the ties that may occur by
bidding .
10It is enough that the expected payoﬀ form the information acquisition is less than the
expected payoﬀ from the uninformed bidding.
15If there are uninformed bidders in the auction, then the winning price
is always above ˜ . This implies that, in equilibrium, the bidders that have
valuations below  never win the auction unless all bidders are informed.
Therefore, conditional on a bidder with valuation  having the highest bid,
he knows that all other bidders must be informed and have valuations below
. Therefore, the bidders with valuations below  b i da c c o r d i n gt ot h er e g u l a r
FPA auction where all bidders valuations are in [0].
We now show that the mixing takes place according to the proposed (·)
a n dt h a tt h e r ea r en op r o ﬁtable deviations for the informed or uninformed on
(˜  ˆ ). We start by assuming that the mixing by the uninformed takes place on
the interval [˜  ˆ ] such that ˜  = () and ˆ  = ˆ () a c c o r d i n gt ot h ed i s t r i b u t i o n
function ˆ (·). The uninformed bidders’ expected payoﬀ is equal to
 =
≡ ˆ ()
z }| { ³
()+( 1− ) ˆ ()
´−1
( − )
for all  ∈ [˜  ˆ ]. The uninformed bidders’ mixed strategy satisﬁes ˆ ()=0
for  ≤ ˜  and ˆ (ˆ )=1 . This information allows us to determine ˆ (·) to be
ˆ ()=















 − ˜ 
 − ˆ 
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Now let’s check that none of the informed bidders want to bid  ∈ [˜  ¯ ].T h e
expected payoﬀ for bidder with type  from bidding  ∈ [˜  ¯ ] is







If the valuation  = , the expected utility is constant for all  ∈ [˜  ˆ ].I ft h e
valuation the expected utility increases with  implying that the bidder
16wants to bid more than ˆ  = ˆ (). If the valuation the expected utility
decreases with  implying that the bidder wants to bid less than ˜  = ().
Since the uninformed bidders do not acquire information their ‘valuation’
is essentially . Therefore, they do not want to bid above ˆ , since this is the
optimal bid for the bidder of type . Similarly they do not want to bid below
˜  since this is the optimal bid for the bidder of type  when all other bidders
are informed and have valuations below .
We now formalize our assumption that the uninformed bidders do not
acquire information in the FPA. The expected payoﬀ for an uninformed bidder
























Now by the monotone convergence theorem we have that as  →∞the
expected revenue tends to −ˆ (1 − ()) −  ≤ 0.
Lemma 6. For all 0 and 0 there exist  ∈  such that if  ≥ 
then 0
Discussion
In the Dutch auction the uninformed bidders may postpone their information
acquisition decision. This allows them to measure the level of competition prior
to acquiring information. As the uninformed observe that the price descends
the information acquisition becomes more attractive. A lower price implies
that the competitors’ valuations are drawn from an interval with a lower upper
bound and hence the competitors’ valuations are also smaller in expectation.
Lower price also implies that the probability that the uninformed bidder has
the highest valuation increases, which is good news for the uninformed. Note
that this is in contrast with what is observed by Rezende (2005) in the context
of an ascending auction. In his model the bidders do not observe the number
of remaining bidders either. It is bad news for the uninformed to observe a
price increase in the ascending auction, since it only conveys the information
that it is less likely that his valuation is the largest among all bidders. In
the ascending price auction, where the number of remaining bidders is not
observed, no information about the intensity of competition is available to the
(uninformed) bidders.
In the ﬁrst price auction it is not possible to defer information acquisition.
In fact, information acquisition quickly becomes unattractive, when the
number of bidders increases. The main reason why the bidding functions diﬀer
in the two auctions is that the competition intensiﬁes sooner in the Dutch
a u c t i o nt h a ni td o e si nt h eﬁrst price auction.11 In the Dutch auction the
bidders know that the competition intensiﬁes as the uninformed bidders start
11Note that Assumption 2 implies that  ∗. We can show that ˆ  ≤ ¯  for large .
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Figure 1: Bid functions for the informed in the FPA and Dutch Auction
to acquire information.12 In the ﬁrst price sealed bid auction the uninformed
bidders start bidding later than in the Dutch auction. Therefore, for a ﬁxed
number of informed bidders, the competition is less intensive in the ﬁrst price
auction.
We highlight this feature with the example in the ﬁgure below. Here the
valuations are uniformly distributed and we graph the bidding functions for the
informed bidders. The uninformed bidders’ mixed strategies ‘ﬁll the gaps’. Ie
the mixing takes place on the interval where the informed bidders’ bid function
jumps. Therefore, the distribution of bids has no jumps in it. It should be
noted that the ﬁrst price auction ends with a winning bid that is weakly above
˜  in all cases but the one where all bidders are informed and have valuations
below .
Notice that the ﬁrst price auction bid function goes above the Dutch
auction bid function for a small range of values. However, the Dutch auction
b i df u n c t i o ns t a y sa b o v et h eﬁrst price auction bid function once they have
crossed.13 For a given number of uninformed bidders the ﬁrst price auction
bids are in the range [˜  ˆ ], while the Dutch auction bids are in the range
[0 ¯ ]. When the number of uninformed bidders increases the expected bid by
an uninformed bidder tends towards ¯  in the Dutch auction while in the ﬁrst
12Note also that in a regular setting with independent private values, the bidders learn
nothing about their opponents during the auction. Here, the bidders learn that all of their
opponents are informed, if price descends below .
13If  =2in this example, the Dutch auction bid function never crosses the ﬁrst price
auction bid function. However, with  =3the crossing occurs.
18price auction it tends towards ˆ . In this sense the uninformed bidders bid
‘more aggressively’ in the Dutch auction.
On an intuitive level this implies that the revenue from the Dutch auction
is larger than from the ﬁrst price auction when the number of bidders is large
enough. This is because with a large number of bidders the probability mass
assigned to the events where the Dutch auction bids are above the ﬁrst price
auction bids converges to unity. At the same time the mass that is assigned to
the events where the ﬁrst price auction bids are above the Dutch auction bids
becomes very small. We now address this issue formally.
3T h e r e v e n u e
We begin by calculating the revenues to the seller from the Dutch and the
ﬁrst price sealed bid auction. We calculate a lower bound of the Dutch
auction revenue and an upper bound of the FPA revenue. We then show that
the revenue approximation for the Dutch auction is larger than the revenue
approximation for the FPA.
The Dutch auction revenue
Let’s ﬁrst calculate the revenue when we know the number of informed
bidders.14 The expected revenue from the Dutch auction with  informed
bidders is 15










































The interpretation of  is straight forward. Either all bidders valuations
are below ∗ or one of the informed bidders with a valuation  ≥ ∗ wins the
auction. Consider then the terms in . Again either all bidders valuations
are below ∗ or conditional on all informed bidders valuations being below ∗
14Here the bidders don’t know the number of informed bidders, but given the equilibrium
strategies the revenue can be calculated in the case when the number of informed bidders is
ﬁxed.
15(See omitted proofs at the end for some additional derivations (Lemma 7.)
19one of the uninformed bidders discovers that his valuation is above ∗ and
bids at the price that he decided about the information acquisition.
Collecting the terms from above we have that
E[R()] =   +(  − ) 
≥











































The ﬁrst price auction revenue
We now calculate the revenue from the ﬁrst price auction. We assume that
there are enough potentially informed bidders so that information acquisition
is an undesirable option. We know from the analysis of the bidding behavior
in the ﬁrst price auction that the uninformed bidders bids are below  on an
interval [˜  ˆ ]. Since we only want to show that the Dutch auction provides
more revenue than the ﬁr s tp r i c ea u c t i o nw ec o m p a r et h eD u t c ha u c t i o n
revenue to an upper bound of the ﬁrst price auction revenue. The upper
bound of the ﬁrst price auction revenue is obtained by calculating the revenue
in a ﬁrst price auction where the seller has a reserve valuation equal to .16
That is, the seller is always guaranteed a minimum of  from selling the object.
This revenue is clearly higher than the revenue from the ﬁrst price auction,
since the uninformed bidders always bid below  in equilibrium. This results
in less aggressive bidding when compared to an auction where the reserve price
is set to . I.e. the informed bidders bid less aggressively in the equilibrium of
the ﬁrst price auction.
Let ˆ (·) denote the bidding function in the ﬁrst price auction with a
reservation value equal to .17 To see that the informed bidders behave more
aggressively in the ﬁrst price auction where the auctioneer is assumed to have
a reservation valuation of  one just needs to show that (·) ≥ ˆ (·).18
16Note that since the uninformed bidders play a mixed strategy the ﬁrst price auction
typically ends with a winning bid that is no less than ˜ 0. Only in the case that all
bidders are informed, may the winning price be below ˜ .
17It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium bidding strategy in the ﬁrst price




˜ ()  +
˜ ()
˜ ().
18We leave this to the reader. (See lemma 8 in the omitted proofs at the end.)
20We now consider the revenue to the seller whose reserve valuation is .
The revenue to the auctioneer from the ﬁrst price auction, when there are 
informed bidders, is given by19
E[R()] =






























() ˜ () +














We show that the lower bound of the Dutch auction revenue is larger than the
u p p e rb o u n do ft h eF P Ar e v e n u e . W es h o wt h a tt h i si st r u ef o rag e n e r i c
and so this proves that the revenue from the Dutch auction is superior to the
revenue of the ﬁrst price auction.20
The Dutch auction produces a superior revenue to the ﬁrst price auction,
if  ∈  is large enough.
Proposition 3. It is suﬃcient to show that for all  ≤ 
E[R()] − E[R()] ≥ 0
We prove this proposition by comparing the terms in equations (3.2) and
(3.3) and by showing that either the terms are positive or that the negative
terms tend to zero as  grows. The proposition is established by showing that
there remain some strictly positive terms for each  that do not depend on .
Proof. We omit the straightforward proofs that 2 −2 ≥ 0 for all  ≤ 
and that lim
→∞3 − 3 → 0 for all  ≤ .21 We now show that the diﬀerence
between the terms 1 4 and 1 4 in equations (3.2) and (3.3) satisﬁes
lim





→∞1 + 4 − 1 − 4 → 0 for  = 
19(See omitted proofs at the end for some additional derivations (Lemma 7.)
20We deal with  =  separately.
21(See lemmas 9 and 10 in the omitted proofs.)
21Let be ﬁxed. Then we have that






























































































































Where the inequality follows from the fact that
 
0 ˜ ()
˜ () is increasing in  and
 ≤ ∗.W es h o wt h a ta s increases the terms in the last equation converge





( − 1)(∗) − ()
´

























22Since (∗) decreases to zero exponentially while  − 1 grows at a constant











()(() − (∗)) → 0
Then consider the second term 2 as  grows.22
lim

























≥ 0, and we use the monotone




















































⇐⇒ (∗) ≥ ()


















22We drop the multiplier () here for convenience.










In addition, the multiplier term (∗) − () is positive and disregarded here as well.
23for all  ∈ [∗]. Then using the monotone convergence theorem, it is











Therefore we can always ﬁnd  ∈  such that the negative terms are less than
the positive ones.
Finally let  = . Above we used the fact that when considering the
term 2.I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v et h a t()=()(∗−) which also converges
to zero as  grows to inﬁnity. The term 3 also has a multiplier that depends
on . The result that the term converges to zero does not change when we
have  = .
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we’ve examined the bidding behavior in ﬁrst price and Dutch
auctions with independent private values. Some bidders may be uninformed
about their valuations and acquire information during the Dutch auction. We
solve for equilibrium in both auctions in this setting and show that the Dutch
auction produces more revenue to the seller than the ﬁrst price auction, when
the number of bidders is large.
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25Appendix
Omitted proofs
Below we refer to the bid of the informed bidder with ˜ . The bid by the
(initially) uninformed bidder is referred to with .
Lemma 3. We derive the expression for  in the proof of lemma 3.
The uninformed bidder is indiﬀerent between acquiring information at any
price  on the interval ( ¯ ). The expected utility for the uninformed bidder
















( − ˜ ())Pr(− | −  ∗)
 Pr(− |   )





 −  |  ≥ ∗
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 Pr(  )
−1−




(∗)+(). Using Assumption 1 we get












































(∗ − )(1 − (∗))
´
Lemma 4. We derive the expressions for  and  in lemma 4.
The case where an uninformed agent considers information acquisition prior
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( − )() − 
´
The case where the uninformed is acquiring information at a price  .
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Lemma 7. Derivations for the expressions in the revenue section.
Dutch. I nt h et e x ta b o v ew ea s s u m e dt h a tt h e r ea r e informed bidders
in the auction that we are studying. A few deﬁnitions are in order before
going forward with the derivations. Here  1
 refers to the ﬁrst order statistic
in a sample of size . When considering the uninformed bidder, we abuse





to the probability that all other bids are below  ∗.
The informed bidders bid below  ≥ ∗ with probability (∗) and all the





































−1  )˜ ()() +
Z ¯ 
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() ˜ () + ()

Lemma 8. (·) ≥ ˆ (·) .
Proof.
























































28Lemma 9. The diﬀerence between the terms 2 and 2 in equations (3.2)
and (3.3) satisﬁes
2 − 2 ≥ 0 for all  ≤  and all  ∈ N


























˜ ()() ≥ 0
for all  ∈ .
Lemma 10. The diﬀerence between the terms 3 and 3 in equations
(3.2) and (3.3) satisﬁes
lim
→∞3 − 3 → 0 for all  ≤ 
Proof. We disregard the term 3 ≥ 0 here, although it can be shown that
it converges to zero. We concentrate on the term 3 in equation (3.3) and

























≥ 0 and lim
→∞
˜ ()



































→∞ ˜ () → 0
as  increases at a ﬁxed rate while ˜ () decreases at an exponential rate and
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